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Reinventing Language, Vowel by Colorful Vowel
 
“Yet any translation which intends to perform a transmitting function cannot 
transmit anything but information—hence, something inessential. This is the 
hallmark of bad translation.” 
                                           —Walter Benjamin “The Task of the Translator”
“Do I know nature yet? Do I know myself?—No more words.”  
                                                       —Arthur Rimbaud, “A Season in Hell”
A Fable of a Fable, or “The Story of One of My Follies”: After 
he’d invented “the color of vowels,” regulated the “form and movement of 
each consonant,” the young poet then, applying his “instinctive rhythms” 
to the task, proudly proclaimed that he had alchemically created “a poetic 
language accessible, some day, to all the senses.” Notably, with his project in 
place, this poet, Arthur Rimbaud, tells us that he was then quick to “reserve 
translation rights.” This legal move on the poet’s part was perhaps thought 
initially necessary because, as he notes in 1873, the described synesthetic 
impact of language, one that would indeed be, if achieved, “accessible. 
. .to all the senses” (371), would only be accessible “some day” but not 
just yet, or at least not yet as translatable to others; this ambitious poetic 
invention, like an entrepreneur’s prototype, or a just-completed but not yet 
manufactured “machine made out of words,” would not yet work for all, 
could not yet be marketed to the masses. In other words, we would have to 
wait for this new and very modern, this “absolutely modern” invention, to 
function, for the colored vowels (before seen only in black and white), for 
the newly regulated consonants (before heard only in rigid formation), to 
achieve fully their promised potential of unlimited sensorial engagement, 
for the multiplicities of its enchantments to work their hallucinatory magic 
upon us.
In the meantime, the poet would make sure that, by having “reserved 
translation rights” (285), no one else would be able to swoop in, as in a 
kind of hostile take-over, and endeavor to translate, or pirate, what the 
poet now legally demanded would be his alone to undertake. After all, this 
invention was a dangerous one for which the poet had already invested 
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much capital, and from which he had emerged from a necessary but barely 
survived “season in hell.” For the poet’s creation would, once available, 
allow articulations long thought off-limits by language, long thought 
unthinkable by thought. Applying its “alchemy of the word,” the “nights” 
would be represented, the “inexpressible” recorded, “silences” would now 
be written without, in the writing, violating those silences. (Earlier in his 
poem, the poet, “not knowing how to explain without using pagan words,” 
had made a kind of anti-monastic vow of silence, insisting—a bit like 
Bartleby—that “I prefer to be silent” (267). Now, however, it seems he’d 
found, with his new invention, a way out of language’s pagan limits, a way 
to speak sacredly again.) Even the exhilarating visceral effects of “vertigo” 
could now, he asserts, be described in words enlivened to enframe that 
enthralling, falling sensation. Who’d have thought that the distressed feeling 
of such a fall could be fashioned by language, any language, while allowing 
the sensation of that fall to keep falling, its words made to fall alongside the 
fallen; “je fixais des vertiges,” Rimbaud wrote, a line of language alternately 
defined later by a variety of, en principe, unauthorized translators as:
• “I defined vertigos”
• or, “I made the whirling world stand still”
• or, “I found the still point of the turning earth”
• or, “I fixed frenzies in their flight”
• or, “I captured dizzying emotions on paper”
• or, by Google Translator, “I stared dizziness”
• (However, one on-line translation site gave the following:“No 
English translation found for ‘je fixais des vertiges’.”)
No wonder the poet felt that his invention had to be protected, its 
translation rights reserved. For, not only was he wanting to preserve the 
purity of his alchemical product (like Mr. White in his Breaking Bad meth 
lab cooking the purest of blue crystals), but he also likely understood that, 
in the wrong hands, someone might get hurt (as he himself had been) 
by innocently undertaking translations of otherwise “inexpressible” 
experience, of those silences, of those nights, of those vertigos, that had for 
so long eluded our heretofore colorless language, its vowels and consonants 
so fixed, so monochromatic. “Can I describe the vision?” the poet had, 
prior to his invention, wondered of his “delirium”; “What language did 
I even speak?” he asked; after all, he continued, “The air of hell does not 
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permit hymns” (275). Falling into the “lowest depths” of that silent night, 
unprotected, one might indeed fall flat. It is, therefore, little wonder that the 
poet felt the urgent need to protect and preserve from errant translation 
what he had for so long worked upon, what he had sacrificed so much to 
achieve.
In Rimbaud’s earlier poem “Vowels,” written a couple of years prior 
in 1871, and to which the poet is likely referring as a part of his later 
“invention” in his “Season in Hell,” he tells us the actual colors of his vowels, 
as “A black, E white, I red, U green, O blue,” speaking of their “latent birth,” 
with he himself as their delivering midwife. Each vowel is then richly, thickly 
described in the poem as a living, material thing, a mortal form that, for 
instance, quivers and spits, laughs from “beautiful lips,” and from which, finally, 
a “purple blood [is] coughed up,” attracting flies that then “buzz around” 
the “stench.” These birthed letters live fleetingly on the page, “their divine 
vibrations” in temporary formation, breathing and shaping into “green seas,” 
then metastasizing, decaying, dying entropically, theatrically in front of our 
eyes. In a kind of reversed alchemical process, what was pure in the word is 
thus transformed into something base in the letters, taking a once-idealized, 
untainted language and returning it to its vulnerable, physical form, like 
changing a bar of gold into a scrap of rusted metal, a “ruin in reverse,” as 
the earthwork artist Robert Smithson might have called it, a poem “ris[ing] 
into ruin” before it is written (72). Emerging from the poet’s own spiraling 
exhalations of life into those previously dormant letters, the words are thus 
made into abject matter, into a resuscitated substance impermanently present, 
immanently absent. Such a conjuring act of effervescent destruction makes 
Rimbaud’s insistence upon translation protections all the more justified. For 
trying to “translate” the kind of material magic of such a reversed alchemy is 
not for the faint of heart, and is not to be left to rank amateurs, nor even (or 
especially) to rank scholars with what Rimbaud calls elsewhere their “heavy 
studious brows” (141). 
Part of Rimbaud’s ambitious endeavor, his self-described act of folly, 
was we know motivated by, or emerged out of, what he spoke of in lines just 
preceding his claim of invention as his rejection of “modern painting and 
poetry,” which he tells us he could not help but find just plain “laughable.” 
Instead, what he loved was a rich amalgamation of the tawdry and the vulgar, 
popular products seen strewn about the city, the accidental ephemera of 
everyday life, such as “stupid paintings, door panels, stage sets, back-drops for 
acrobats, signs, popular engravings, old-fashioned literature, erotic books with 
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bad spelling, church Latin, novels of our grandmothers, fairy tales, little books 
from childhood, old operas, ridiculous refrains, naïve rhythms.” It was, as 
Rimbaud explains, largely from his eager embrace of the non-canonical and 
the anti-academic of the time, what he calls his “poetic old-fashionedness” 
(or, in reverse, his anti-poetic far-sightedness) that his “alchemy of the word” 
was finally to reversibly arise. From there, its “pure hallucinations” were 
formed from these cultural impurities lovingly seen on the street and found 
by the flâneur. The teeming life promiscuously extended beyond the narrow 
confines of the city’s, the academy’s, otherwise “laughable” achievements, 
what he called the “horribly insipid” and perceptually prescribed “subjective” 
poetry of the day. In their place, he offered illuminations, hallucinations, in 
which the now self-described “objective” poet, his subjectivity long ago 
dispersed into his myriad perceptions, becomes himself an object (or several 
of them simultaneously), at one point depicting this self, these selves, as having 
metamorphosed into what he called “a disreputable sign for an inn,” while 
moments later he is transformed again, this time even more fantastically, 
into “a fabulous opera” (293). Picture that, in the body of the poet: a kind 
of living, breathing Gesamtkunstwerk! As what Baudelaire had described, of 
the flâneur, that “kaleidoscope endowed with consciousness” (400), the poet 
then sees an array of shifting and disordered events, floating indiscriminantly, 
fluidly before his own watery eyes: “quite frankly a mosque in place of a 
factory, a school of drummers made up of angels, carriages on roads in the 
sky, a parlor at the bottom of the lake; monsters, mysteries. . .the disorder of 
my mind as sacred” (289).
This “hallucination of words” was to make, as we now know, the poet a 
“seer,” a voyant, one who would, as described in Rimbaud’s famous letters, 
“lose [through his developed seeing] the intelligence of his visions.” Only 
then, “bewildered” by the loss, would he know that he had “seen them,” 
by losing them, dying each time “as he leap[t] through unheard of and 
unnamable things” (377) transforming unnamably before him. But what 
had been seen in the leaping but something of seeing itself, and of the seer 
seeing himself seeing, in that vertiginous falling of sight, in time, through 
the unheard, the unnamed, and the dissolution of perceptions (and the 
perceiver) through the concurrent dissolution of the colorful and re-
regulated letters that could only ephemerally form as they fell, before 
they too faded away, falling into a nothing now suddenly seen. Seeing 
that! . . . Feeling that! . . .the vertige of such a leap into loss, into language, 
causing a capacity of incapacitated sight for which translation must quite 
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understandably be “reserved.” For this invented language was, Rimbaud 
writes, “of the soul for the soul, containing everything, smells, sounds, colors, 
thought holding onto thought and pulling” (379). Who but the “objective” 
poet, the poet as an object set in kaleidoscopic motion, is qualified or capable 
of being such a seer, of translating such a seeing? Or, is even he up to such a 
task, such a tall order of translation, one who is, after all, “someone else” even 
to himself. “I am present at the birth of my thought,” he tells us. “I watch it 
and listen to it. . . ,” as that moving thought passes lightly through the air, like 
a dancer “com[ing] on to the stage in a leap” (375), a leap of language, a leap 
into its own loss of thought.
A more recent seer, the artist Robert Smithson (known best for his Spiral 
Jetty in Utah), one who looked at rocks in much the same way that Rimbaud 
looked at words, through what he called “a consciousness of temporality. . 
.chang[ing] into something that is nothing,” offers potential guidelines for 
such translation of sight, stating that:
“Words and rocks contain a language that follows a syntax 
of splits and ruptures. Look at any word long enough and 
you will see it open up into a series of faults, into a terrain 
of particles each containing its own void. . . . Poetry being 
forever lost must submit to its own vacuity; it is somehow a 
product of exhaustion rather than creation. Poetry is always 
a dying language but never dead one.”
Smithson consequently advised, in ways that might be seen as further 
illuminating the task of translation: “To reconstruct what the eye sees in 
words, in an ‘idealized language’ is a vain exploit. Why not reconstruct one’s 
inability to see? Let us give passing shape to the unconsolidated views that 
surround a work. . .and develop a type of ‘anti-vision’ or negative seeing” 
(120). And, by extension, from Smithson’s assembled stones to the poet’s 
written words, to translate what the eye sees into an “idealized language,” any 
language, would likely result in a similarly “vain” endeavor; why not translate 
one’s inability to translate, submitting a poem “to its own vacuity” where 
what is most needed is a new kind of vision, seeing negatively now into 
something unseeable, unsayable.
In Rimbaud’s famous “letters of the seer,” he had insisted that the poet 
must “make himself a seer by a long, gigantic and rational derangement of all 
the senses.” This dérèglement of the senses would include, or begin with, the 
Five Points /  109
dérèglement of the consonants, the coloration of the vowels, toward, what he 
called, a “rational derangement of all the” sentences accessing those senses (377). 
To see at all, to see anew, would require such derangements of perception, 
perhaps a kind of Smithsonian “‘anti-vision’ or negative seeing” that would 
in the seeing—even in something as seemingly solid as stone, as trustworthy as 
a word—see a “something that is nothing”; otherwise, all that would be seen, 
all that would be written, would be that which had already been written and 
always been seen before, blindingly repeated, and so blindingly unseen, the 
same sight, again and again and again. . . , transmitting only what Benjamin 
called “information—hence, something inessential. . .the hallmark of bad 
translations” (69).
Leo Bersani, still one of Rimbaud’s most insightful, visionary readers, 
claimed that the poet’s “most revolutionary ambition for poetry was,” as he 
notes, “to make it mean as little as possible” (230). And so how, one wonders, 
is one to translate that, the ambition of ceasing to mean, of writing into a kind 
of absence, an absence of sense, of visions bewilderingly lost in the seeing? 
Through what Bersani calls Rimbaud’s various “gestures of renunciation,” he 
describes the poet as having created with his poetic inventions. . .
a mental mechanism which unfailingly ejects anything that 
threatens to occupy the mind. . .[for] language is of course a 
structured system, and as such. . .it is inherently antagonistic 
to mental life as discontinuous, hallucinated and random 
identifications with the external world. (247)
In order to represent faithfully the unrepresentability of that 
“discontinuous, hallucinated” world, might Bersani’s described 
“mechanism” of  “renunciation” be a vital part of  Rimbaud’s “absolutely 
modern” invention? Might the colored vowels, the re-regulated “form and 
movement” of the poem’s consonants, this poem appear  but briefly in all 
their glorious and multidimensional form, and then for the poem’s that 
“structured system” to self-destruct? As Bersani continues, speaking further 
of the language needed for such an alchemical achievement:
The poetic illumination must pass through or ‘cross’ 
language, but it must also dismiss a medium which both 
serves it and subverts it value. It should therefore ‘stay’ in 
language as briefly as possible. . .[making] a single verbal 
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sequence so impenetrably dense that the reader can 
‘understand’ it only as fragmented bits of vision. (249)
Crossing the language, while also crossing it out, erasing its traces as it 
goes. . .Is this now the magical task that translators have before them? 
Walter Benjamin wrote that “Meaning is served far better—and literature 
and language far worse—by the unrestrained license of bad translators” (78). 
But what about Bersani’s claim of Rimbaud’s desire to “mean as little as 
possible,” with the reader left to “‘understand’ only. . . fragmented bits of 
vision”? There, the “unrestrained license of bad translators” would likely 
only offer what Benjamin elsewhere characterized as the “inessential,” 
merely “information.” Anticipating this inevitable violation of his intended 
repudiation of meaning, Rimbaud’s earlier insistence upon reserving 
“translation rights” for the eventual application of his colored vowels and 
reregulated consonants was perhaps thus a repudiation en avance of those 
who might later make his poetry “stay” in place, mean too much (when it 
was designed all along to keep moving, to resist or reject the “vain exploits” 
of such singular, such a settled simulacrum of meaning, while giving instead, 
what Smithson had called, “passing shape to the unconsolidated views”).
Might then the only acceptable translation, one that Rimbaud alone 
was to undertake “some day,” be a simultaneous one, but radically, impossibly 
simultaneous, instantaneous in time, splitting the instant like an atom, 
with the fissioning words emerging from two mouths at once, from two 
tongues entangled, two languages brightly entwined in that most immediate 
of radioactive moments? After all, Rimbaud’s colorful vowels and the re-
regulated consonants were invented to cause a kind of chain-reaction of 
simultaneous, glutted sensation in which the poem would semantically 
implode in the reading, its fuses blown in the seeing, breaking down, 
pictorially dissolving, decaying under the weight of its own dispersed words. 
Like the “metamechanics” of a self-destroying sculpture by Jean Tinguely, 
this “machine made out of words” spins and sputters only to wheeze and 
whisper into its own grinding decline. Limiting the life of such a living 
and dying language, a well-meaning but “bad translator,” with his “heavy, 
studious brow,” might unsimultaneously miss entirely the point of missing a 
point, only to singularly, colorlessly restrict the poet’s frenzied multiplicities, 
rendering static (even if informationally meaningful) a poem intended to 
create, “some day,” its own ecstatic, technicolor collapse.
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